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Abstract 
This paper analyses how the functional components of public expenditure and 
spending-driven consolidations affect the economic growth, unemployment and income 
inequality. A dynamic panel data LSDVC estimator is employed over a sample of 15 
European Union countries during the period 1990-2012. The empirical results show that real 
GDP growth decreases when fiscal austerity measures are implemented, especially if they are 
spending-driven. Cuts in public expenditure undermine economic growth, namely if they 
slash spending on public order, recreation and education. Spending cuts on education, in 
particular, affect the investment in human capital, harming not only growth but also 
economic, social and human development. The unemployment rate also proved to be 
significantly boosted when austerity measures restrict spending on education, while income 
inequality rises when social protection expenditures are cut. 
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1. Introduction 
The funds transferred by fiscal authorities to rescue the banking sector and the 
discretionary measures adopted by several European Union (EU) countries, in particular, to boost 
the economic activity in the aftermath of the recent Great Recession led to considerable fiscal 
deficits and pushed government debts to historically high levels. Consequently, this forced EU 
countries to abandon those expansionary fiscal policies and to design austerity programmes. The 
Greek crisis boosted this process, as countries wanted to convince the markets that they were in a 
better and solid position. Hence, several consolidation and austerity packages started to be 
implemented to correct those unbalances. At the same time, this process revived the interest of 
the academics in studying their economic impact and implications. In particular, the fiscal 
austerity measures implemented recently by several EU countries have intensified the discussion 
on their impact over the economic activity and the well-being of their citizens. 
While the EU institutions emphasize the importance of fiscal consolidations as a 
requirement for a sustainable growth in the long-run, the US argue that they hurt short-term 
growth and longer adjustment periods should be allowed. Assessing the trade-off between 
consolidation of public finances and economic growth is fundamental for the formulation of 
effective policies. Several studies have looked at this relationship between fiscal consolidations 
and economic growth (see, among others, Alesina and Ardagna, 1998, 2010; Perotti, 2011; 
Anderson et al., 2014; Cugnasca and Rother, 2015). The role of the kind of a consolidation 
(spending or tax-driven) and its composition are also taken into account in the literature (Alesina 
and Perotti, 1995, 1997; McDermott and Wescott, 1996; Alesina and Ardagna, 1998, 2010; 
Gupta et al. 2005; Silva et al., 2013). Tax cuts are found to be more expansionary than spending 
increases. Regarding the composition, they assess the impact of expenditure components on 
economic growth considering the economic decomposition of public expenditures. 
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On the effects over unemployment, there are fewer studies. For example, Turrini (2013) 
shows that this impact is temporary and relevant only for public expenditures. A few recent 
papers are moving the focus of the analysis to the distributional effects of fiscal austerity 
measures (see, for example, Ball et al., 2013; Agnello and Sousa, 2014). 
Nevertheless, as far as we are concerned, no study analyses how the functional 
components of public spending affect economic growth, unemployment or income inequality. 
Thus, this study represents an important step forward relatively to the previous literature, as it 
allows us to identify and understand which and how the functional components of public 
expenditure affect the economic activity. Additionally, this analysis allows us to draw some 
suggestions in terms of the design of fiscal consolidations by fiscal authorities regarding their 
main functions: providing public services, defence, public order and safety, housing amenities, 
health services, recreation and culture, education, social protection, etc. Knowing the impact of 
those components on the economy allows fiscal authorities to take action to mitigate the negative 
economic and social effects of spending-driven fiscal consolidations and to avoid the 
deterioration of the well-being of the most vulnerable citizens. 
An LSDVC estimator is used in the empirical analysis over a panel of EU countries and 
the results show that real GDP growth decreases when spending-driven fiscal austerity measures 
are implemented. Cuts in public expenditure undermine economic growth, especially if they slash 
spending on public order, recreation and education. Spending cuts on education, in particular, 
affect the investment in human capital, harming not only growth but also economic, social and 
human development. The unemployment rate is also boosted when austerity measures restrict 
spending on education, while income inequality rises when social protection expenditures are cut. 
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This article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of the relevant 
literature. Section 3 describes the data and presents the econometric model. The main results are 
presented and discussed in section 4 and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
The EU countries have faced important economic and social challenges in terms of weak 
economic growth, persistent unemployment and a perceived increase in income inequality. At the 
same time high budget deficits and public debts have forced several countries to implement 
austerity measures. Whether those measures are undermining even more the economic activity or 
not has revived the debate among politicians and economists. 
In the literature, there are several papers looking at the impact of fiscal consolidations on 
economic growth. Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) challenge the idea of a positive fiscal multiplier 
by arguing that fiscal consolidation adjustments can have an expansionary impact on the 
economic activity. Later, Perotti (1999) shows that consolidations can indeed be expansionary 
when the public debt is high or when it is growing very quickly. In the same line, Alesina and 
Ardagna (1998, 2010), Miller and Russek (2003) show that growth performance is improved 
after periods of drastic and decisive spending cuts. Furthermore, Alesina and Perotti (1995, 
1997), McDermott and Wescott (1996) and Alesina and Ardagna (1998) state that the 
composition of public accounts matters to understand the private sector response to fiscal policy 
and the consequent impact on growth. They show that fiscal adjustments that rely on cuts in 
transfers and wages tend to last longer and can be expansionary, while those that rely on tax 
increases and cuts in public investment are contractionary. 
Considering a sample of low-income countries, Gupta et al. (2005) also shows that strong 
budgetary positions are generally associated with higher economic growth in both the short and 
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long terms. They also confirm that the composition of public outlays also matters in those 
countries. In particular, countries where spending is concentrated on wages tend to have lower 
growth, while those that allocate higher shares to capital and nonwage goods and services enjoy 
faster output expansion. More recently, Silva et al. (2013) also show that transfers are the driving 
force of the expenditure dynamics, with wages exhibiting a negative impact on output, while 
positive effects arise from shocks in public investment. 
Using a structural VAR approach, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) find that positive 
government spending shocks increase output, consumption and decrease investment, while 
positive tax shocks have a negative effect on output, consumption and investment. However, in 
the cases of fiscal stimulus, Alesina and Ardagna (2010) show that tax cuts are more 
expansionary than spending increases. Forni et al. (2010) presents a more radical finding as they 
conclude that the best fiscal consolidation strategy is to permanently reduce both expenditures 
and tax rates. They argue that with this consolidation strategy the transition is generally not 
costly, as the GDP and investment would grow. Developing a two country DSGE model, Erceg 
and Linde (2013) show that tax-based consolidations have smaller adverse effects on output than 
expenditure-based consolidations in the near-term, though is more costly in the longer-run. 
Nevertheless, the works on endogenous growth have suggested that fiscal policy can 
either promote or undermine economic growth as investment in physical and human capital can 
affect steady-state growth rates (Barro, 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). Thus, while 
Easterly et al. (1994) support the belief that healthy budgetary balances are good for growth over 
the long-run, others argue that the effect of fiscal consolidation on growth in the short-run can 
have negative consequences (see Cimadomo et al., 2010; Perotti, 2011; Silva et al., 2013; 
Anderson et al., 2014; Cugnasca and Rother, 2015; among others). In particular, Perotti (2011) 
argues that spending cuts cause significant short-run output losses. 
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Studies on the impact of fiscal consolidation on unemployment are scarce. For example, 
with respect to public employment, Heylen et al. (2013) find that public wage bill cuts do not 
contribute to lower public debt ratios when public sector efficiency is high. In a study for a panel 
of EU countries, Turrini (2013) shows that the impact of fiscal consolidations on unemployment 
is temporary and significant mainly for expenditures. 
The distributional effects of fiscal austerity are also under the scope of some studies 
(Mulas-Granados, 2005; Ball et al., 2013; Agnello and Sousa, 2014; Furceri et al., 2015; Agnello 
et al., 2016; among others). Income inequality is observed to rise during fiscal consolidations 
especially if they are spending-driven. In particular, Mulas-Granados (2005) finds that successful 
fiscal consolidations are associated with higher income inequality. Ball et al. (2013) and Agnello 
and Sousa (2014) corroborate this finding. Moreover, Agnello and Sousa (2014) shows that 
consolidations driven by spending cuts are more detrimental for income distribution than those 
driven by tax hikes. Agnello et al. (2016) provide a regional analysis for 13 European countries 
and argue that fiscal consolidations that rely on reductions in government spending can 
exacerbate regional disparities and may ultimately counteract the European policy efforts to 
promote territorial cohesion. In contrast, Ball et al. (2013) find that both expenditure and 
taxed-based fiscal consolidations at the national level have typically raised inequality for a panel 
of OECD countries, even if the distributional effects of spending-based adjustments tends to be 
larger relative to tax-based adjustments. Furceri et al. (2015) also show that fiscal consolidations 
increase income inequality, but they also show that they lower wage income shares in the short 
and medium-term. 
In this paper, we take a step forward relatively to the existing studies in order to identify 
and understand which and how the functional components of public expenditure affect the 
economic activity in a panel of 15 EU countries. Moreover, we also provide a comparative 
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analysis between a particular group of countries – recently affected by unfavourable economic 
and financial conditions, increasing public deficits and debts and that have implemented harsh 
austerity packages – known in the literature as PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain) 
and the other ten EU countries. This analysis allows us to draw some proposals in terms of the 
design of fiscal consolidations by fiscal authorities and contribute to the debate on their impact 
over economic growth, unemployment and income inequality. 
 
3. Data and model specification 
To analyse the impact of the functional components of government expenditures (and 
fiscal consolidations) on the economic activity, we collected annual data for the 15 countries that 
were members of the European Union in the end of the 1990s. The main reason to consider only 
those EU countries is that the disaggregated fiscal data for other EU countries is of poor quality. 
Even for the selected countries, the available data provided by the Eurostat database for the 
functional components of public expenditure covers only the period 1990-2012.
1
 Hence, we are 
forced to restrict our analysis to that time period. 
Three specifications are considered to estimate the impact of the fiscal variables on the 
economic activity. The first accounts for their impact on real GDP growth: 
 
RealGDPit = α+ γRealGDPit-1 + βEconit + θFiscalit + δTrendit + vi + eit   (1) 
 
                                                             
1 The countries (data availability) considered in this study are: Austria (1995-2012), Belgium (1990-2012), Denmark 
(1990-2012), Finland (1990-2012), France (1995-2012), Germany (1991-2012), Greece (1990-2012), Ireland 
(1990-2012), Italy (1990-2012), Luxembourg (1990-2012), Netherlands (1995-2012), Portugal (1990-2012), Spain 
(1995-2012), Sweden (1995-2012), United Kingdom (1990-2012). 
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where i=1,…,15, t=1990,…,2012. RealGDP represents the real growth rate of GDP; the 
coefficient on its lag (γ) accounts for its persistence. The vector β captures the impact of the 
economic controllers, while θ measures the impact of the fiscal variables. A time-trend is also 
included in the specification to account for the evolution of real GDP growth and any 
technological changes over time. Regarding the last components, νi is the individual effect of 
each country i, and eit is the error term. 
The set of economic variables includes proxies for the traditional determinants of output 
growth (see, for example, Bassanini and Scarpetta, 2001; Gupta et al., 2005): the growth rate of 
the labour force as percentage of total population (LabourForce); the growth rate of private 
investment as percentage of GDP (PrivInvestment); the average number of years of schooling 
(Schooling), to control for the human capital endowment in each country; the growth rate of trade 
openness, computed as imports plus exports as percentage of GDP (Openness); and the growth 
rate of the long-term interest rate on government bonds (Interest), to account for the monetary 
policy dynamics.
2
 The data for these variables, and for the dependent variable (RealGDP), were 
collected from the Eurostat database, except for the average years of schooling which comes from 
the World Development Indicators (WDI) of the United Nations. 
The vector of the fiscal variables comprises two sub-sets of co-variates: the first accounts 
for the fiscal consolidations; and the second for the public expenditures and respective functional 
components. Fiscal consolidation episodes were identified using the work of Devries et al. (2011) 
for the period 1990-2009 and updated from Kataryniuk and Vallés (2015) for the years 
2010-2012. Both authors use a narrative approach to identify those consolidations. For the 
missing data for Greece and Luxembourg, we are consistent with the narrative approach and 
                                                             
2 Most of the variables used in this study are in growth rates to avoid the unit root problems. Stationarity tests are not 
reported here, but they are available upon request. 
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combine the information provided by Kataryniuk and Vallés (2015), Dellepiane and Hardiman 
(2012) and OECD (2011) country notes on Restoring Public Finances to obtain the respective 
consolidation periods and kind.
3
 Hence, our fiscal consolidation variable (Consolidation) is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one in the years in which a fiscal consolidation is being 
implemented (zero, otherwise). To account for the impact of the kind of fiscal consolidation on 
the economic activity we use two alternative dummy variables: SpendConsol and TaxConsol. 
Following Devries et al. (2011), SpendConsol takes the value of one if the consolidation is driven 
by a spending cut (zero, otherwise) and TaxConsol takes the value of one if the consolidation is 
driven by an increase in taxation (zero, otherwise). According to the literature, we expect that 
fiscal consolidations, especially spending-driven, might have a significant and strong impact on 
the economic activity.
4
 
The total general government expenditures (TotalSpending) and each of the respective 
components are considered in the next sub-set. That analysis is based on a break-down of 
government expenditures as defined by the OECD in its Classification of the Functions of the 
Government (COFOG).
5
 It classifies government expenditure data from the System of National 
Accounts by the purpose for which the funds are used, also called functional decomposition. This 
classification splits public expenditures into ten functional components: (i) general public 
                                                             
3 As argued by Devries et al. (2011), the standard statistical approach which focuses on variation in the cyclically 
adjusted primary budget balance (CAPB) may lead to biased results for two reasons. First, the CAPB may suffer 
from measurement error that is likely correlated with economic developments. Second, it omits periods during which 
fiscal consolidation programs are followed by adverse shocks, offsetting discretionary measures. For these reasons, 
we follow the narrative approach, which is based on the examination of accounts and records of what countries were 
intending to do at the time of publication of different institutional reports, to uncover policy actions that are 
motivated by deficit reduction. See notes at the bottom of Table A.1 in Annex for the years of fiscal consolidations. 
4 See, among other references, Alesina and Ardagna (2010), Gupta et al. (2005), Forni et al. (2010), Perotti (2011), 
Silva et al. (2013), Turrini (2013), Anderson at al. (2014), Agnello and Sousa (2014), Cugnasca and Rother (2015). 
5 See OECD (2015), Government at a Glance. 
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services (PublicServices); (ii) defence (Defence); (iii) public order and safety (PublicOrder); (iv) 
economic affairs (EconAffairs); (v) environmental protection (Environment); (vi) housing and 
community amenities (Housing); (vii) health (Health); (viii) recreation, culture and religion 
(Recreation); (ix) education (Education); (x) social protection (SocialProtect). We expect that 
some of these components affect real GDP growth in a significant way. 
In fact, our expectation for the consolidation and fiscal variables relies on the Keynesian 
theory. Keynes showed that aggregate demand and growth may remain low after a shock if the 
government does not intervene to boost the economy. Hence, expansionary fiscal policy, by 
increasing public spending on investment and consumption, raises demand for more products and 
services and stimulates employment (or reduces unemployment to its natural level). This means 
that government expenditure can boost the economy and help to reduce unemployment. 
Therefore, we also conjecture that spending components will behave in the same way, with some 
being more influential than others. One of the aims of this study is precisely to identify which 
ones are more effective in stimulating economic growth, employment and equality. At the same 
time, the Keynesian view also supports our expectation that fiscal consolidations may undermine 
growth, boost unemployment and contribute for an increase in income inequality. 
The second specification estimated in this study analyses how the labour market, in 
particular, the unemployment rate, reacts to changes in the functional components of public 
spending and fiscal consolidations. In this case, we estimate the following equation: 
 
Unempit = α+ γUnempit-1 + βEconit + θFiscalit + δTrendit + vi + eit   (2) 
 
where i=1,…,15, t=1990,…,2012. Unemp represents the growth rate of the unemployment 
rate; the coefficient on its lag (γ) accounts for its persistence. Once again, the vector β captures 
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the impact of the economic controllers, while θ measures the impact of the fiscal variables. The 
other components and the set of fiscal variables are the same as in equation (1). However, in this 
case, the economic controllers include: the output gap (OutputGap), computed as the difference 
between the potential and the actual GDP using the Hodrick-Prescott filter, to control for the 
business cycle; PrivInvestment; Schooling; Openness; and the growth rate of real wages (Wages), 
to account for demand-supply pressures in the labour market.
6
 
The last issue to consider in this study is whether (and how) the fiscal variables 
(consolidations and spending components) affect the distribution of income or, more precisely, 
the income inequality. To estimate this relation, we consider the following specification: 
 
Giniit = α+ γGiniit-1 + βEconit + θFiscalit + δTrendit + vi + eit   (3) 
 
where i=1,…,15, t=1990,…,2012. The dependent variable, Gini, represents the growth 
rate of the Gini index; the coefficient on its lag (γ) accounts for its persistence.7 In this case, we 
use as proxies for its economic determinants: the growth rate of real GDP per capita 
(RealGDPpc); Schooling; Openness; and Wages. The other components remain identical to the 
ones considered in equation (1).
8
 
                                                             
6 Once again, most of the variables are in growth rates to avoid the unit root problems. The data for the additional 
variables, and for the dependent variable (Unemp), were collected from the Eurostat database. 
7 The data for the Gini index comes from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID). Nolan et al. 
(2009) state that this measurement of income inequality improves the comparability across different studies as it 
captures different points in the distribution and measures of income inequality levels and trends in a harmonised 
way. Solt (2009) also says that it provides a greater cross-country and temporal coverage. We focus on the definition 
that accounts for gross taxes; the results with the definition accounting for net taxes have proved to be weaker. 
8 Descriptive statistics for all the variables used in this study can be found in Table A.1 in Annex. 
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Given the presence of individual effects νi, all the three models can be estimated assuming 
those effects as fixed or random. However, the lagged value of each dependent variable would be 
correlated with the respective error term even if the latter is not serially correlated. This implies 
that OLS estimates (random or fixed effects) will be biased and inconsistent. Although the fixed 
effects estimator gains consistency as the number of time periods increases, in our analysis its 
number is not big enough (T=23) to rely on its estimates. 
The estimators that take into account that bias can be grouped into instrumental variables 
estimators and bias-corrected estimators. According to the large sample properties of the 
generalized method of moments (GMM), the dynamic estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991) is adequate when there is a clear dominance of cross sections over time periods in the 
sample. This is not the case in our panel, in which the cross sectional dimension is small (N=15), 
and almost of the same dimension as the time periods (T=23). This means that the dynamic panel 
data estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) is not the most suitable procedure to solve 
the problem. More specifically, given our panel structure, it will also be biased if employed to 
this analysis. Hence, a bias-corrected estimator is more appropriated here. 
Therefore, we apply Bruno’s (2005a, b) bias-corrected least squares dummy variable 
estimator (LSDVC) for dynamic panel data models with small N (and not large enough T). In the 
regressions, we employ the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator as the initial estimator. In this 
case the instruments are collapsed as suggested by Roodman (2009), which makes sure that we 
avoid using invalid or too many instruments. Following Bloom et al. (2007), we undertake 50 
repetitions of the procedure to bootstrap the estimated standard errors.
9
 The respective empirical 
results are presented and discussed in the next section. 
                                                             
9 Bootstrapping the standard errors is a common practice when this estimator is applied because Monte Carlo 
simulations proved that the analytical variance estimator performs poorly for large coefficients of the lagged 
  13 
 
4. Empirical results 
The findings of this study are carefully analysed and discussed in this section. We start by 
considering how real GDP growth reacts to the fiscal consolidations and spending components; 
then we move to a similar analysis for the unemployment rate; the last issue to be considered is 
the behaviour of income inequality. In each of these sub-sections we also account for the 
heterogeneity, providing a comparison between the PIIGS and the other ten EU countries. 
 
4.1. Economic growth analysis 
The results from the estimation of the impact of fiscal consolidations and the components 
of public expenditures on the economic growth are presented in Table 1. All variables are in 
growth rates (except Schooling, which is stationary in levels) to avoid the unit root problems.
10
 
We start by looking at the impact of fiscal consolidations on GDP growth, before analysing the 
behaviour of public spending and the respective functional components. 
 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
 
As expected and in line with some recent works by Cimadomo et al. (2010), Perotti 
(2011), Silva et al. (2013), Anderson et al. (2014) and Cugnasca and Rother, 2015, the results 
presented in column 1 show that fiscal consolidations (Consolidation) have a significant negative 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
dependent variable (see Bruno, 2005a, b). We should also stress that our results do not qualitatively change with 
more repetitions (100, 200 or even 500) or when either Arellano and Bond (1991) or Anderson and Hsiao (1982) 
estimators are used as initial estimators instead. 
10 Panel unit root tests are not reported here to save space, but they are available upon request. 
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impact on GDP growth (RealGDP) in the short-term: during periods of fiscal consolidations the 
growth rate of real GDP is, on average, almost one percentage point lower than in the other 
periods. In regression 2, we account for the kind of consolidation instead. Our findings support 
the view that spending-driven consolidations (SpendConsol) have an immediate negative impact 
on growth, while tax-driven ones (TaxConsol) are less harmful (Perotti, 2011; Erceg and Linde, 
2013). 
As the implementation of spending-driven consolidations undermines economic growth, 
we proceed the analysis by looking at public spending (see column 3) and, most importantly, at 
the respective functional components (columns 4-8).
11
 The results reported in column 3 support 
the previous ones, as when total public spending (TotalSpending) is boosted, real GDP growth 
increases. This means that our evidence for public spending is in line with the Keynesian view. 
Hence, cuts in government spending (spending-driven austerity measures) have an immediate 
negative impact on economic growth. But, which components inside total public expenditure 
contribute more to that effect? The aim of the next analysis is to answer this question. 
Column 4 reports the results with all the functional components of public expenditures in 
growth rates. They show that expenditures in public order, recreation and education are the 
components that contribute more for economic growth. Fiscal consolidations that promote cuts 
especially in those items will affect real GDP growth significantly. For the same group of EU 
countries, Castro (2016) shows that expenditures on defence, public order, health, education and 
social protection are significantly cut during fiscal consolidations, undermining citizens’ safety, 
health assistance, investment in human capital and social protection. In this study, we show that 
                                                             
11  For an analysis on the economic decomposition of public spending see Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1997), 
McDermott and Wescott (1996), Alesina and Ardagna (1998), Gupta et al. (2005) and Silva et al. (2013). 
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from the expenditures that are usually cut during fiscal consolidations, the ones that end up 
having a more significant effect on growth are indeed public order and education. 
We believe that spending on education plays an important role in this process, as 
decreases in the investment in human capital are known to have a significant negative impact on 
economic growth (see, for example, Bassanini and Scarpetta, 2001, and references therein). 
Regarding public order it is not so clear, but it is possible that spending on police services, 
fire-protection, law courts and safety in general can have a direct effect in terms of more 
employment and investment in this sector and an indirect effect in what concerns to social 
stability and safety that might benefit the overall economic environment. Additionally, the 
promotion of recreational and cultural activities (via recreational and sporting services, cultural 
services, broadcasting and publishing services, community services) seems to exert similar 
positive spillover effect over the economy. 
These results and conclusions remain essentially unchanged when we consider the growth 
of the functional components of public expenditures per capita (column 5), fixed or 
random-effects estimators (columns 5 and 6, respectively),
12
 or when we account for endogeneity 
on the fiscal variables (column 8). In the last regression presented in Table 1 we use an 
instrumental variables estimator where fixed effects are controlled for. It could be the case that 
economic growth itself influences fiscal variables. For example, when economic growth slows 
down, the components of government spending might decrease. Moreover, some degree of 
reverse causality could also be present in the relationship between growth and private investment. 
Hence, if economic growth is a determinant of any of the right-hand side variables in our model, 
estimation techniques that ignore this endogeneity will yield biased and inconsistent parameter 
                                                             
12 The usual panel data tests (F, LM and Hausman tests) favour the fixed-effects estimator, even though in this 
dynamic panel data model they can be biased. 
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estimates. The fiscal components are instrumented with their lags (as well as private investment), 
but reverse causality is not found to affect significantly the parameter estimates. Moreover, the 
endogeneity Durbin-Wu-Hausman test does not reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity. 
Regarding the economic controllers, the results are in line with the expectations and the 
studies on economic growth:
13
 private investment and labour force promote economic growth; 
years of schooling contribute for a better economic performance, but the results are not so 
statistically significant; openness to trade also boosts economic growth; but the role of monetary 
policy has not proved to be relevant. Finally, besides the persistence in the dependent variable, 
we observe a decreasing trend in economic growth over the period 1990-2012 in the 15 EU 
countries considered in this analysis. 
Next we provide a comparative analysis between the group of countries usually called in 
the literature as PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain) and the other ten EU countries 
considered in this study. The PIIGS are known for being more “relaxed” with their public 
accounts. However, recently they were affected by unfavourable economic and financial 
conditions which boosted their public deficits and debts. The unfavourable conditions that they 
have faced (recession and unemployment), the high levels of public deficits and debts that they 
present and the difficulties that they have felt in borrowing money to finance their economies 
were critical to account for this distinction. Due to those problems, they were forced to 
implement severe fiscal packages and some needed external financial assistant to overcome their 
financial and/or fiscal unbalances. This means that this we must pay a special attention to this 
group of countries in this analysis to check whether they present a different behaviour from the 
others or not. 
                                                             
13 See, among others, Barro (1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001), Bassanini et al. 
(2001) and Gupta et al. (2005). 
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The results from this separate analysis are shown in Table 2. We consider the same 
specification as in Table 1 and use the LSDVC estimator only. In the first set of four columns are 
reported the results for the PIIGS and in the second set the results for the other ten countries. 
 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
 
The impact of fiscal consolidations on real GDP growth has proved to be negative and 
highly significant in both groups of countries, especially if they are spending-driven. Moreover, 
when total public spending is boosted, real GDP growth increases. These results support the 
previous ones for the whole sample and show that despite the specificities of these two groups of 
countries, they are similarly affected in terms of the economic growth when they implement 
fiscal authority packages. 
When we look at the results for the components inside total public spending, despite the 
positive effect of spending on public order being confirmed for both groups of countries, things 
change a little in the other cases: while spending on recreation is relevant in the non-PIIGS, the 
positive effect of increasing spending in education is only found in the PIIGS. This means that 
cuts in education should be especially avoided in these countries as they have a significant 
negative impact on their growth path and, at the same time, might undermine their future human 
development. 
In addition, we also observe that spending on environmental protection has a positive 
impact on real GDP growth in the PIIGS. Regarding the economic controllers, despite some 
particularities (labour force, interest rate,…), in general, the results are not very different from the 
ones obtained with the whole sample. 
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4.2. Unemployment analysis 
Another important issue to consider is how fiscal consolidations and expenditure 
components affect the labour market, more precisely, the evolution of unemployment in the 
economy. The analysis provided in Table 3 aims at shedding some light on that issue. Like 
economic growth has proved to be affected by fiscal consolidations and the changes it causes 
inside public expenditure, unemployment can also be affected by austerity measures that restrict 
important components of public spending. 
 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
 
The results presented in the first three columns in Table 3 clearly show that the growth 
rate of unemployment is significantly affected by fiscal consolidations, especially those that are 
meant to cut spending. In sum, austerity measures that cut public spending end up boosting 
unemployment. This evidence is in line with the one obtained in the previous analysis for real 
GDP growth and corroborates the idea that fiscal austerity measures have an immediate negative 
impact on the economic activity. 
The next set of results indicates which expenditure components influence the most the 
evolution of the unemployment rate. According to our findings, consolidations that aim at 
reducing spending on defence, public order and education are the ones that will contribute to a 
more significant boost in the unemployment rate. The same reasons indicated above for their 
impact on the real GDP growth can be considered here, as cuts in those areas will affect 
employment and investment in those sectors. Surprisingly, cuts (increases) in social protection 
are shown to be related to lower (higher) unemployment rates. In fact, social protection tends to 
increase when unemployment increases, so it is possible that we have here a reverse causality 
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problem. In fact, when we control for endogeneity (in the same way as in the growth analysis), 
we observe that the coefficient on social protection is no longer significant (see column 8 in 
Table 3). The endogeneity test also points out to some marginal evidence of endogeneity. 
Anyway, solved this problem, the other results and conclusions remain valid. 
Regarding the controllers, the results are also in line with our expectations and the 
economic literature. To account for the impact of the economic environment, we use the output 
gap: when it increases, the unemployment rate decreases significantly. Private investment and 
trade openness have a similar effect, while wage increases tend to put pressure on unemployment, 
maybe because labour is regarded as more expensive than the economic agents would expect. 
The number of years of schooling has not proved to be relevant in this analysis, but – similarly to 
what we have found for growth – the evolution of the unemployment rate has followed an 
increasing trend over the period in analysis for the 15 EU countries here considered. 
Similarly to what we have done in economic growth analysis, we also account next for 
heterogeneity issue. The separate results for the PIIGS and the other ten countries are reported in 
Table 4. The results show that the negative impact of fiscal consolidations on unemployment is 
significant only in the PIIGS. This might be the case because most of the fiscal austerity 
packages implemented in that group of countries (especially the ones implemented more 
recently) involve the reduction of labour force in the public sector and the restructuration of the 
labour market. Nevertheless, our results also show that cutting public spending end up boosting 
unemployment in both groups of countries. 
 
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
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Regarding the components of public spending the results are mixed: (i) consolidations 
aimed at reducing spending on defence affect equally both groups of countries and are in line 
with the results for the whole sample; (ii) cuts in spending on economic affairs, environmental 
protection and public services are relevant only in the PIIGS; the unemployment rate is 
negatively affected by cuts in spending on public order and education only in the other group of 
countries. 
Finally, in what concerns to the controllers, the main finding is that the economic 
environment, years of schooling and degree of openness seem to matter for the evolution of the 
unemployment rate in the other ten countries than in the PIIGS. Nevertheless, all the significant 
results are in both groups are line with the literature. 
 
4.3. Income inequality analysis 
In a final analysis, we look at the impact of fiscal consolidations and expenditure 
components behaviour on income inequality. Using a panel of 18 industrialized countries from 
1970 to 2010, Agnello and Sousa (2014) show that income inequality rises during periods of 
fiscal consolidations, especially if they are driven by spending cuts.
14
 We corroborate that 
evidence in our sample of 15 EU countries over the period 1990-2012, as can be seen in the 
results reported in Table 5 (see columns 1-3). However, we move a step forward in order to 
identify the spending components that play a major role in this process. 
 
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
 
                                                             
14 See also Ball et al. (2013), Furceri et al. (2015) and Agnello et al. (2016), this last for a regional analysis. 
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Even thought the results reported in Table 5 are not as robust as in the previous analyses, 
one important message that arises from this analysis is that income inequality decreases 
significantly when government spending on social protection increases. Hence, fiscal 
consolidations that promote cuts in this component will contribute to a more unfair distribution of 
income and to an increase of inequalities in a society. This evidence remains valid even when we 
use per capita values for the expenditure components (in growth rates), fixed and random effects 
estimators and the IV estimator (with RealGDPpc and the fiscal components instrumented with 
their lags). In addition, we also observe that increases (decreases) in environment (housing) 
spending are negatively correlated to income inequality, but the results are not very robust to 
drawn clear conclusions. 
Concerning the controllers, the growth rate of the Gini index has proved to decrease when 
the growth rate of real GDP per capita increases and when the growth rate of real wages 
decreases (and, to some extent, when the economy is less open to trade). While increases in 
wages are not promoting more equality, it is the growth in income per capita that does the most 
for income equality. Regarding the other controllers, no additional relevant results are found. 
The results for the separate analysis between the PIIGS and the other ten countries are 
presented in Table 6. However, we have no evidence to corroborate that income inequality rises 
immediately during periods of fiscal consolidations (spending or tax-driven) in either group of 
countries. As already observed in the estimations for the whole sample, the evidence of 
short-term effects is weaker. In the spirit of the works of Ball et al. (2013) and Agnello and Sousa 
(2014), we conclude that the effects of fiscal consolidations over income inequality may take 
more time to be observed than the immediate effects on economic growth and unemployment. 
 
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
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Nevertheless, when we look at the components of public spending we corroborate the 
finding that income inequality decreases significantly when spending on social protection 
increases. The results for the controllers remain essentially the same, with the growth rate of real 
GDP per capita playing the major role. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper analyses the impact of fiscal consolidations and the functional components of 
public expenditures on economic growth, unemployment and income inequality over a panel of 
15 EU countries for the period 1990-2012. A separate analysis between five particular countries 
(called PIIGS) and the other ten EU countries is also considered. 
The empirical analysis shows that real GDP growth decreases when fiscal austerity 
measures are implemented, especially if they are spending-driven. This result is also observed in 
both the PIIGS and the other ten EU countries. Hence, cuts in public spending undermine 
economic growth and the components that proved to drive this effect are public order, recreation 
and education. Fiscal consolidations that promote cuts in those items affect real GDP growth 
significantly, especially in the group of the five more vulnerable countries. In particular, spending 
cuts on education play an important role in this process, as decreases in the investment in human 
capital are detrimental not only for the growth path of a country but also for its economic, social 
and human development. Thus, fiscal consolidations must refrain from imposing strict and blind 
financial constraints or cuts on education spending; otherwise fiscal authorities can undermine 
not only a country’s economic activity but also its future prospects of development. 
The unemployment rate has also proved to be significantly affected by austerity measures 
that restrict important components of public spending. This trend has proved to be more relevant 
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in the PIIGS. Those consolidations that aim at reducing spending on defence, public order and 
education are the ones that contribute to a more significant boost in the unemployment rate. The 
same reasons pointed out for education (in the real GDP growth analysis) can be considered here 
to convince fiscal authorities to refrain from cutting spending on education. Regarding the other 
sectors, cuts usually involve the reduction of public servants (jobs) and investments that end up 
exerting a negative effect in terms of the private sector investments, social stability and safety, 
with important spillover effects over the economy. 
This analysis is not so successful in showing a short-term impact of fiscal consolidations 
on income inequality. However, we do find that income inequality decreases significantly when 
government spending on social protection increases. Hence, fiscal consolidations that promote 
cuts in this component foment a more unfair distribution of income and an increase of 
inequalities in a society. 
The main message of this study can be summarized as follows: fiscal authorities must be 
careful when they design a fiscal austerity package in order to avoid cutting spending in those 
areas that can undermine the economy the most. Spending on education is one of the components 
that deserves a special attention in terms of the impact it has on the economic activity, while 
spending on social protection is detrimental to avoid an increase in income inequality. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Expenditure components, fiscal consolidations and GDP growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 LSDVC LSDVC LSDVC LSDVC LSDVC FE RE IV 
         
L.RealGDP 0.2855*** 0.2791*** 0.2453*** 0.1928*** 0.1831*** 0.1632** 0.2331*** 0.1040** 
 (0.0347) (0.0342) (0.0444) (0.0416) (0.0443) (0.0610) (0.0544) (0.513) 
PrivInvestment 0.1639*** 0.1646*** 0.1573*** 0.1304*** 0.1321*** 0.1324*** 0.1177*** 0.1311*** 
 (0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0129) (0.0139) (0.0160) (0.0271) (0.0221) (0.0250) 
LabourForce 0.1265* 0.1288* 0.3909*** 0.3324*** 0.3189*** 0.3377** 0.3702*** 0.3480*** 
 (0.0656) (0.0660) (0.0944) (0.0926) (0.0842) (0.1227) (0.1223) (0.1028) 
Schooling 0.1773 0.1806 0.4922* 0.4764** 0.3911 0.4802** 0.1303 0.5245* 
 (0.3282) (0.3295) (0.2543) (0.2377) (0.2918) (0.1754) (0.0867) (0.3059) 
Openness 0.1598*** 0.1609*** 0.1644*** 0.1869*** 0.1878*** 0.1848*** 0.1970*** 0.1800*** 
 (0.0158) (0.0156) (0.0188) (0.0204) (0.0189) (0.0230) (0.0227) (0.0208) 
Interest 0.0007 0.0003 0.0046 0.0086 0.0094 0.0088 0.0083 0.0092 
 (0.0055) (0.0056) (0.0068) (0.0067) (0.0064) (0.0076) (0.0081) (0.0060) 
Trend -0.1173*** -0.1190*** -0.1530*** -0.1385*** -0.1290*** -0.1424*** -0.1056*** -0.1643*** 
 (0.0335) (0.0335) (0.0267) (0.0260) (0.0311) (0.0219) (0.0163) (0.0350) 
Consolidation -0.9019***        
 (0.2509)        
SpendConsol  -1.0863***       
  (0.2624)       
TaxConsol  -0.5241       
  (0.3216)       
TotalSpending   0.1134***      
   (0.0197)      
PublicServices    0.0111 0.0106 0.0102 0.0210 0.0078 
    (0.0175) (0.0174) (0.0191) (0.0175) (0.0177) 
Defence    0.0140 0.0102 0.0144 0.0091 0.0151 
    (0.0104) (0.0119) (0.0089) (0.0121) (0.0105) 
PublicOrder    0.0446*** 0.0493*** 0.0457*** 0.0329** 0.0496*** 
    (0.0161) (0.0190) (0.0144) (0.0146) (0.0173) 
EconAffairs    0.0015 0.0053 0.0014 0.0006 0.0013 
    (0.0019) (0.0048) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0020) 
Environment    -0.0003 0.0037 0.0003 -0.0005 0.0033 
    (0.0089) (0.0083) (0.0085) (0.0068) (0.0094) 
Housing    -0.0001 -0.0004 0.0001 -0.0005 0.0005 
    (0.0034) (0.0036) (0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0034) 
Health    0.0286 0.0333 0.0303 0.0320 0.0329 
    (0.0221) (0.0257) (0.0234) (0.0247) (0.0236) 
Recreation    0.0305** 0.0308*** 0.0311** 0.0251* 0.0303** 
    (0.0126) (0.0119) (0.0142) (0.0138) (0.0124) 
Education    0.0686*** 0.0677** 0.0678*** 0.0781*** 0.0622** 
    (0.0266) (0.0310) (0.0146) (0.0161) (0.0251) 
SocialProtect    -0.0309 -0.0405 -0.0332 -0.0069 -0.0289 
    (0.0327) (0.0289) (0.0214) (0.0248) (0.0309) 
         
         
#Observations 322 322 296 296 294 296 296 289 
#Countries 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
R2      0.7117 0.7055 0.7119 
F-test      1.82[0.036]  1.58[0.085] 
LM-test       1.53[0.108]  
Hausman-test       31.57[0.017]  
Endog.-test        19.35[0.309] 
         
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. 
All variables are in growth rates (except Schooling); in regression 5, the expenditure components are in growth rates of their per 
capita values. The bias-corrected least squares dummy variable (LSDVC) estimator developed by Bruno’s (2005a, b) is employed 
in regressions 1-5; 50 repetitions of the procedure are run to bootstrap the estimated standard errors. Fixed and random effects 
estimators are used in regressions 6 and 7, respectively, while a fixed-effects IV estimator is employed in regression 8. The F, LM 
and Hausman panel data test-statistics and the endogeneity Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-square test-statistic are reported at the 
bottom of the table (the respective p-values in square brackets). 
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Table 2. Effects on GDP growth: PIIGS versus the other countries 
 PIIGS Other Countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
         
L.RealGDP 0.4550*** 0.4542*** 0.4456*** 0.2801*** 0.1087** 0.0969** 0.0808 0.1035* 
 (0.0740) (0.0732) (0.0751) (0.0849) (0.0453) (0.0443) (0.0559) (0.0597) 
PrivInvestment 0.1376*** 0.1365*** 0.1452*** 0.1297*** 0.1771*** 0.1772*** 0.1558*** 0.1242*** 
 (0.0247) (0.0258) (0.0238) (0.0231) (0.0210) (0.0209) (0.0180) (0.0202) 
LabourForce 0.3599** 0.3725** 0.4495*** 0.4979*** 0.0216 0.0374 0.2297* 0.1873 
 (0.1474) (0.1513) (0.1694) (0.1473) (0.0709) (0.0707) (0.1207) (0.1266) 
Schooling 0.0525 0.0661 -0.0858 -0.0264 0.3465 0.3740 0.7833** 0.6096* 
 (0.5376) (0.5482) (0.7362) (0.7027) (0.3344) (0.3317) (0.3499) (0.3500) 
Openness 0.1230*** 0.1225*** 0.1037*** 0.1398*** 0.1628*** 0.1650*** 0.1956*** 0.2046*** 
 (0.0268) (0.0271) (0.0229) (0.0274) (0.0177) (0.0175) (0.0204) (0.0217) 
Interest -0.0016 -0.0013 0.0062 0.0079 0.0263*** 0.0261*** 0.0259*** 0.0269*** 
 (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0088) (0.0090) (0.0096) (0.0095) (0.0087) (0.0081) 
Trend -0.0862 -0.0876 -0.0948 -0.0908 -0.1207*** -0.1267*** -0.1641*** -0.1354*** 
 (0.0681) (0.0691) (0.0726) (0.0719) (0.0312) (0.0311) (0.0364) (0.0363) 
Consolidation -1.0567**    -0.4440*    
 (0.4585)    (0.2622)    
SpendConsol  -1.0067**    -0.7224**   
  (0.5052)    (0.3191)   
TaxConsol  -1.1738**    0.0315   
  (0.5707)    (0.3690)   
TotalSpending   0.0928***    0.1219***  
   (0.0298)    (0.0237)  
PublicServices    0.0165    0.0158 
    (0.0294)    (0.0236) 
Defence    -0.0085    0.0123 
    (0.0232)    (0.0131) 
PublicOrder    0.0389**    0.0630** 
    (0.0190)    (0.0309) 
EconAffairs    0.0058    0.0009 
    (0.0055)    (0.0018) 
Environment    0.0492**    -0.0068 
    (0.0209)    (0.0087) 
Housing    0.0016    -0.0059 
    (0.0040)    (0.0080) 
Health    0.0351    -0.0251 
    (0.0333)    (0.0370) 
Recreation    -0.0032    0.0518** 
    (0.0157)    (0.0201) 
Education    0.0470**    0.0657 
    (0.0217)    (0.0444) 
SocialProtect    -0.0011    -0.0280 
    (0.0443)    (0.0497) 
         
         
#Observations 105 105 100 100 217 217 196 196 
#Countries 5 5 5 5 10 10 10 10 
         
Notes: See Table 1. Estimates obtained using the LSDVC estimator; 50 repetitions of the procedure are run to bootstrap the 
estimated standard errors, reported in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; 
and *, 10%. All variables are in growth rates (except Schooling). 
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Table 3. Expenditure components, fiscal consolidations and unemployment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 LSDVC LSDVC LSDVC LSDVC LSDVC FE RE IV 
         
L.Unemp 0.3867*** 0.3832*** 0.3984*** 0.3215*** 0.3261*** 0.2825** 0.3169*** 0.4274*** 
 (0.0474) (0.0484) (0.0469) (0.0469) (0.0459) (0.1027) (0.1076) (0.0863) 
OutputGap -0.7864** -0.7453** -0.6877** -0.8266*** -0.7555** -0.8843*** -0.6711*** -0.5824* 
 (0.3275) (0.3192) (0.2714) (0.2591) (0.3024) (0.2599) (0.2410) (0.3205) 
PrivInvestment -0.9485*** -0.9523*** -0.8802*** -0.7590*** -0.7823*** -0.7734*** -0.7862*** -0.6732*** 
 (0.1098) (0.1093) (0.0987) (0.1022) (0.1197) (0.1939) (0.1855) (0.1409) 
Schooling -2.9787 -2.9198 -4.1236 -3.7063 -3.0121 -3.9376** 0.1282 -2.1736 
 (2.2798) (2.3053) (2.6471) (2.6089) (2.1443) (1.7963) (0.3560) (2.5377) 
Openness -0.6837*** -0.6950*** -0.7477*** -0.7111*** -0.7145*** -0.6846*** -0.7056*** -0.8387*** 
 (0.1496) (0.1485) (0.1355) (0.1500) (0.1313) (0.1670) (0.1657) (0.1591) 
Wages 0.5487 0.5392 1.1553** 1.4667*** 1.6464*** 1.4448 1.2160 1.5587*** 
 (0.5015) (0.4970) (0.5113) (0.5551) (0.4042) (0.8964) (0.8199) (0.4737) 
Trend 0.5823** 0.5832** 0.7251*** 0.6205** 0.5530** 0.6456** 0.2825* 0.4701* 
 (0.2715) (0.2750) (0.2614) (0.2571) (0.2658) (0.2563) (0.1717) (0.2722) 
Consolidation 2.3892**        
 (1.2160)        
SpendConsol  3.9581**       
  (2.0052)       
TaxConsol  0.7217       
  (2.5458)       
TotalSpending   -0.6666***      
   (0.1453)      
PublicServices    0.0727 0.0520 0.0748 0.1080 0.0592 
    (0.1259) (0.1338) (0.1645) (0.1789) (0.1373) 
Defence    -0.2459*** -0.2500*** -0.2430*** -0.2598*** -0.2815*** 
    (0.0740) (0.0718) (0.0745) (0.0830) (0.0865) 
PublicOrder    -0.3145** -0.4057** -0.3131** -0.2316* -0.3683** 
    (0.1335) (0.1681) (0.1399) (0.1336) (0.1455) 
EconAffairs    -0.0059 -0.0726** -0.0055 -0.0043 -0.0080 
    (0.0155) (0.0341) (0.0276) (0.0292) (0.0149) 
Environment    -0.0596 -0.0677 -0.0623 -0.0795 -0.0650 
    (0.0574) (0.0511) (0.0791) (0.0764) (0.0693) 
Housing    -0.0125 -0.0008 -0.0143 -0.0144 -0.0039 
    (0.0244) (0.0298) (0.0101) (0.0093) (0.0253) 
Health    -0.0986 -0.1038 -0.1170 -0.1582 -0.0165 
    (0.1735) (0.1803) (0.1353) (0.1407) (0.1883) 
Recreation    -0.0204 -0.0098 -0.0260 -0.0029 0.0099 
    (0.0764) (0.0982) (0.0736) (0.0682) (0.0962) 
Education    -0.4262** -0.3830* -0.4223* -0.3926* -0.3369* 
    (0.1766) (0.2299) (0.2226) (0.2033) (0.1980) 
SocialProtect    0.5531** 0.6117*** 0.5766** 0.6543*** 0.4448 
    (0.2316) (0.2180) (0.2205) (0.2291) (0.3371) 
         
         
#Observations 302 302 282 282 280 282 282 274 
#Countries 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
R2      0.5911 0.5834 0.5509 
F-test      1.78[0.042]  1.64[0.069] 
LM-test       0.98[0.321]  
Hausman-test       27.99[0.045]  
Endog.-test        26.55[0.065] 
         
Notes: See Table 1. All variables in growth rates (except Schooling and OutputGap); in regression 5, the expenditure components 
are in growth rates of their per capita values. 
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Table 4. Effects on unemployment: PIIGS versus the other countries 
 PIIGS Other countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
         
L.Unemp 0.1839* 0.1790 0.3233*** 0.1803** 0.4137*** 0.4063*** 0.3949*** 0.3975*** 
 (0.1116) (0.1104) (0.0949) (0.0827) (0.0506) (0.0506) (0.0510) (0.0553) 
OutputGap -0.7004 -0.7366 -0.4602 -0.7329* -1.3228*** -1.2115*** -1.2491*** -1.2102*** 
 (0.5587) (0.5627) (0.4212) (0.3926) (0.4838) (0.4701) (0.3706) (0.3952) 
PrivInvestment -0.8432*** -0.8343*** -0.8579*** -0.8728*** -0.8836*** -0.9027*** -0.7729*** -0.6692*** 
 (0.2061) (0.2085) (0.2268) (0.2401) (0.1409) (0.1374) (0.1386) (0.1513) 
Schooling -0.0706 -0.5829 2.2158 2.3448 -4.5939* -4.6809* -5.8162** -4.1878* 
 (5.3252) (5.3500) (9.2457) (7.9113) (2.6184) (2.8243) (2.7868) (2.5684) 
Openness -0.4936* -0.4875* -0.3913 -0.2838 -0.7319*** -0.7598*** -0.8791*** -0.8281*** 
 (0.2575) (0.2586) (0.2457) (0.2739) (0.1618) (0.1553) (0.1431) (0.1485) 
Wages 1.3529 1.3933 1.7116** 1.6637** 0.5285 0.5015 1.0879** 1.5100*** 
 (0.8484) (0.8561) (0.6929) (0.6613) (0.5509) (0.5472) (0.5489) (0.5633) 
Trend 0.9122 0.9742 0.7288 0.3447 0.5913** 0.6224** 0.7187** 0.5795** 
 (0.6759) (0.6755) (0.8173) (0.7432) (0.3005) (0.3069) (0.2952) (0.2802) 
Consolidation 10.5481**    -1.0613    
 (4.5658)    (1.9077)    
SpendConsol  9.3050**    1.5768   
  (4.7118)    (2.0916)   
TaxConsol  13.3083**    -3.6836   
  (5.8949)    (2.4872)   
TotalSpending   -0.7361**    -0.6251***  
   (0.3042)    (0.2120)  
PublicServices    0.5572    -0.1636 
    (0.3608)    (0.1315) 
Defence    -0.5869***    -0.1690** 
    (0.2063)    (0.0799) 
PublicOrder    -0.0762    -0.3180** 
    (0.2444)    (0.1492) 
EconAffairs    -0.1323***    0.0150 
    (0.0469)    (0.0152) 
Environment    -0.3434*    0.0150 
    (0.1806)    (0.0625) 
Housing    -0.0047    0.0129 
    (0.0345)    (0.0543) 
Health    -0.4359    0.0637 
    (0.3472)    (0.1948) 
Recreation    0.0229    -0.0193 
    (0.1286)    (0.1456) 
Education    0.1101    -0.5201** 
    (0.2973)    (0.2313) 
SocialProtect    0.9230**    0.3885 
    (0.4567)    (0.3838) 
         
         
#Observations 92 92 88 88 210 210 194 194 
#Countries 5 5 5 5 10 10 10 10 
         
Notes: See Table 3. Estimates obtained using the LSDVC estimator; 50 repetitions of the procedure are run to bootstrap the 
estimated standard errors, reported in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; 
and *, 10%. All variables are in growth rates (except Schooling and OutputGap). 
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Table 5. Expenditure components, fiscal consolidations and inequality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 LSDVC LSDVC LSDVC LSDVC LSDVC FE RE IV 
         
L.Gini 0.3619*** 0.3609*** 0.3456*** 0.3311*** 0.3278*** 0.2687*** 0.2835*** 0.0907 
 (0.0542) (0.0529) (0.0517) (0.0517) (0.0583) (0.0815) (0.0801) (0.2228) 
RealGDPpc -0.2801*** -0.2829*** -0.3036*** -0.2278*** -0.2199*** -0.2353*** -0.2254*** -0.2225*** 
 (0.0615) (0.0612) (0.0551) (0.0591) (0.0712) (0.0623) (0.0595) (0.0794) 
Schooling -0.3125 -0.3228 0.0154 0.1616 0.0990 0.1360 -0.1299** 0.1402 
 (0.3853) (0.3845) (0.5446) (0.5558) (0.4851) (0.5254) (0.0649) (0.4438) 
Openness 0.0298 0.0315 0.0538** 0.0379 0.0320 0.0401* 0.0392** 0.0380 
 (0.0262) (0.0260) (0.0236) (0.0288) (0.0311) (0.0194) (0.0188) (0.0309) 
Wages 0.0928* 0.0948* 0.0978* 0.1599*** 0.1490* 0.1581** 0.1562** 0.1491** 
 (0.0564) (0.0564) (0.0530) (0.0620) (0.0790) (0.0709) (0.0659) (0.0704) 
Trend -0.0329 -0.0349 -0.0531 -0.0653 -0.0589 -0.0639 -0.0364 -0.0372 
 (0.0389) (0.0390) (0.0516) (0.0526) (0.0523) (0.0552) (0.0364) (0.0488) 
Consolidation 0.0996*        
 (0.0536)        
SpendConsol  0.3022*       
  (0.1668)       
TaxConsol  0.3095       
  (0.4110)       
TotalSpending   -0.0469*      
   (0.0270)      
PublicServices    0.0109 0.0127 0.0130 0.0150 0.0245 
    (0.0227) (0.0274) (0.0129) (0.0132) (0.0261) 
Defence    -0.0053 -0.0016 -0.0045 -0.0044 -0.0072 
    (0.0144) (0.0135) (0.0096) (0.0094) (0.0150) 
PublicOrder    -0.0193 -0.0226 -0.0191 -0.0173 -0.0060 
    (0.0336) (0.0318) (0.0194) (0.0182) (0.0347) 
EconAffairs    0.0022 0.0069 0.0022 0.0023 0.0025 
    (0.0021) (0.0054) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0026) 
Environment    -0.0207** -0.0153 -0.0210 -0.0219 -0.0220* 
    (0.0105) (0.0124) (0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0118) 
Housing    0.0073* 0.0068* 0.0070** 0.0067** 0.0064 
    (0.0041) (0.0040) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0044) 
Health    -0.0157 -0.0278 -0.0176 -0.0232 -0.0042 
    (0.0408) (0.0435) (0.0379) (0.0364) (0.0343) 
Recreation    -0.0084 -0.0081 -0.0087 -0.0081 -0.0097 
    (0.0196) (0.0194) (0.0120) (0.0125) (0.0179) 
Education    -0.0130 -0.0181 -0.0130 -0.0092 -0.0234 
    (0.0431) (0.0462) (0.0293) (0.0285) (0.0418) 
SocialProtect    -0.0951** -0.0970** -0.0957** -0.1016*** -0.0831** 
    (0.0433) (0.0401) (0.0386) (0.0358) (0.0423) 
         
         
#Observations 299 299 279 279 277 279 279 272 
#Countries 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
R2      0.2395 0.2377 0.1908 
F-test      1.54[0.099]  1.54[0.097] 
LM-test       0.02[0.887]  
Hausman-test       24.12[0.087]  
Endog.-test        71.20[0.000] 
         
Notes: See Table 1. All variables in growth rates (except Schooling and OutputGap); in regression 5, the expenditure components 
are in growth rates of their per capita values. 
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Table 6. Effects on income inequality: PIIGS versus the other countries 
 PIIGS Other countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
         
L.Gini 0.3622*** 0.3470*** 0.3758*** 0.3256** 0.3390*** 0.3391*** 0.3039*** 0.3024*** 
 (0.1016) (0.0992) (0.1320) (0.1422) (0.0566) (0.0560) (0.0734) (0.0803) 
RealGDPpc -0.4304*** -0.4258*** -0.4089*** -0.2879** -0.2527*** -0.2529*** -0.2783*** -0.2191** 
 (0.1008) (0.1005) (0.1071) (0.1221) (0.0706) (0.0701) (0.0836) (0.0961) 
Schooling -0.2536 -0.4551 0.5484 0.7290 -0.2232 -0.2129 -0.1771 0.0225 
 (1.0475) (1.0405) (1.5819) (1.6577) (0.4222) (0.4191) (0.4921) (0.5177) 
Openness -0.0008 -0.0007 0.0114 0.0033 0.0481* 0.0480* 0.0746** 0.0579* 
 (0.0372) (0.0370) (0.0368) (0.0666) (0.0256) (0.0264) (0.0316) (0.0350) 
Wages 0.2207* 0.2117* 0.1303 0.1791 -0.0069 -0.0042 0.0707 0.1170 
 (0.1141) (0.1148) (0.1272) (0.1390) (0.0837) (0.0833) (0.0938) (0.1026) 
Trend -0.1170 -0.0974 -0.1825 -0.2124 -0.0271 -0.0284 -0.0190 -0.0327 
 (0.1286) (0.1275) (0.1604) (0.1735) (0.0482) (0.0479) (0.0519) (0.0546) 
Consolidation 0.5202    0.0264    
 (0.8593)    (0.2758)    
SpendConsol  0.9009    0.0149   
  (0.8941)    (0.3529)   
TaxConsol  0.3835    0.1528   
  (1.2204)    (0.3953)   
TotalSpending   -0.0766*    0.0109  
   (0.0452)    (0.0309)  
PublicServices    0.0388    0.0116 
    (0.0520)    (0.0322) 
Defence    -0.0157    -0.0099 
    (0.0350)    (0.0146) 
PublicOrder    0.0463    -0.0468 
    (0.0682)    (0.0391) 
EconAffairs    0.0041    0.0016 
    (0.0089)    (0.0028) 
Environment    -0.0469    -0.0128 
    (0.0385)    (0.0118) 
Housing    0.0077    0.0020 
    (0.0061)    (0.0068) 
Health    -0.0463    -0.0099 
    (0.1015)    (0.0379) 
Recreation    0.0006    -0.0026 
    (0.0252)    (0.0261) 
Education    -0.0304    -0.0120 
    (0.0782)    (0.0627) 
SocialProtect    -0.1378**    -0.0802* 
    (0.0668)    (0.0445) 
         
         
#Observations 90 90 86 86 209 209 193 193 
#Countries 5 5 5 5 10 10 10 10 
         
Notes: See Table 5. Estimates obtained using the LSDVC estimator; 50 repetitions of the procedure are run to bootstrap the 
estimated standard errors, reported in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; 
and *, 10%. All variables are in growth rates (except Schooling and OutputGap). 
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ANNEX 
 
 
 
Table A.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
RealGDP 345 2.09 2.78 -8.54 11.27 
Unemp 330 3.55 18.37 -26.91 112.54 
Gini 330 0.61 2.48 -5.93 13.31 
      
LabourForce 330 0.22 1.46 -16.61 4.13 
PrivInvestment 330 -1.06 6.64 -24.69 18.47 
Schooling 345 9.60 1.36 6.04 12.24 
Openness 330 2.10 6.03 -20.67 15.56 
Interest 322 -4.44 16.60 -48.58 89.74 
Wage 314 1.03 1.98 -8.53 8.51 
RealGDPpc 330 1.43 2.69 -9.10 9.19 
OutputGap 345 -0.25 2.85 -8.17 10.65 
Consolidation 345 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 
SpendConsol 345 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 
TaxConsol 345 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 
TotalSpending 304 1.93 5.47 -26.93 34.65 
PublicServices 304 0.75 6.34 -20.38 29.34 
Defence 304 0.00 10.92 -70.08 78.87 
PublicOrder 304 18.31 272.29 -28.44 474.84 
EconAffairs 304 0.77 49.52 -68.11 279.14 
Environment 304 3.88 17.29 -73.08 210.17 
Housing 304 2.12 29.85 -93.37 397.46 
Health 304 4.28 19.39 -17.68 321.67 
Recreation 304 3.67 16.32 -36.22 235.36 
Education 304 2.11 6.09 -19.06 45.76 
SocialProtect 304 2.57 4.77 -14.45 21.27 
Notes: All variables in growth rates (except Schooling, OutputGap and the consolidation dummies). Time period: 1990-2012 
(annual data); Countries and respective years of fiscal consolidations: Austria (1996-1997, 2001-2002, 2011-2012), Belgium 
(1990, 1992-1994, 1996-1997, 2010-2012), Denmark (1995, 2011-2012), Finland (1992-1997, 2010-2012), France (1991, 
195-1997, 1999-2000, 2011-2012), Germany (1991-1995, 1997-2000, 2003-2004, 2006-2007, 2011-2012), Greece (1991-1992, 
1994-2000, 2010-2012), Ireland (2009-2012), Italy (1991-1998, 2004-2007, 2011-2012), Luxembourg (1996-1997), Netherlands 
(1991-1993, 2004-2005, 2011-2012), Portugal (2000, 2002, 2005-2007, 2010-2012), Spain (1992-1997, 2010-2012), Sweden 
(1993-1998), United Kingdom (1994-1999, 2010-2012). 
Sources: OECD (2011), Restoring Public Finances; OECD (2015), Government at a Glance; Eurostat database 
(http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database); World Development Indicators (WDI); Standardized World Income Inequality 
Database (SWIID); Devries et al. (2011); Dellepiane and Hardiman (2012); Kataryniuk and Vallés (2015). 
 
 
